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Introduction 
Ten years on from signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement, is the Republic of 
Macedonia’s1 peace process, of which municipal decentralisation is a primary 
component, broadly benefitting all communities equally? To what extent is municipal 
decentralisation and minority protection mechanisms administered at the local level 
preserving Macedonian society’s multiethnic character, or has the country taken a step 
closer towards the development of a bi-national state? There were definitely ‘winners’ as 
a result of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, but were there also ‘losers’, and who are 
they? 
The decentralisation process in Macedonia has widely been regarded as a success 
story by regional and international actors alike. It is frequently considered a suitable 
model of ethnic conflict management that can be replicated in other regional contexts, 
such as for Serbs living in neighbouring Kosovo. Decentralisation sought to offer limited 
autonomy to Macedonia’s ethnic communities, in particular the ethnic Albanians. By 
increasing the number of competencies administered at the municipal level, the reforms 
aimed to provide local, culturally diverse communities greater control over the 
management of their own affairs. This paper seeks to apprise the minority rights 
protection mechanisms contained in the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, particularly 
those at the municipal level, along with implementation of the wider of decentralisation 
reforms. The paper will also consider the claim that the protection mechanisms 
envisaged in Ohrid and the process of decentralisation to date has not benefitted all 
Macedonia’s ethnic communities equally. Rather, it has reinforced steps towards bi-
nationalism at the expense of genuine multiculturalism which, according to Bhikhu 
Parekh2, regards minority cultures equally central to a state’s identity (Parekh, 2006:  6). 
1. Ohrid Framework Agreement and Minority Rights Protection Mechanisms 
Macedonia became an independent state in September 1991. The most southerly 
located of the former Yugoslav republics, Macedonia shares borders with Albania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo and Serbia; and its ethnically diverse population, although 
totally a mere two million, reflects the cultural diversity of the region and a legacy 
changing borders and empirical conquests. According to the most recent census in 
2002, Macedonia’s ethnic breakdown is 64.18 percent Macedonian, 25.17 percent 
                                                
1  Hereafter referred to as ‘Macedonia’. It should be noted that the ‘Republic of Macedonia’ is the 
constitutional name for the state, however this name is the subject of dispute with neighbouring Greece. 
Consequently, the Republic of Macedonia is currently recognised under its temporary name the ‘Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (‘FYROM’) in its dealings with international organisations, such as the 
United Nations and European Union. 
2  According to Bhikhu Parekh, the term ‘multiculturalism’ implies the traditional culture of the majority 
should not be give pride of place in state policy. Minority cultures should be equally central to state 
identity and should be respected and even cherished. 
Lyon, Municipal Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia                                                 29	  
 
Albanian, 3.85 percent Turkish, 2.66 percent Roma, 0.48 percent Vlach, 1.78 percent 
Serbian, 0.84 percent Bošniak, and 1.04 percent who declared themselves ‘Other’ 
(Statistical Office, 2005: 713). After a decade of attempts to consolidate the country’s 
transition towards democracy and a market economy, and of appeasing increasingly 
vocal demands from ethnic Albanian politicians for greater collective rights, Macedonia 
found itself on the brink of civil war in 2001. The peace agreement3 that was signed in 
August 2001 reflects the demands of the ethnic Albanian insurgents; an issue of 
significance which will be discussed later, and laid the foundations or a ‘Framework’ for 
the enhanced recognition of community rights. 
According to Florian Bieber and Veton Latifi, the main goal of the Framework Agreement 
was to accommodate the grievances of the Albanian community, whilst at the same time 
address the concerns of the Macedonian majority by preserving the territorial integrity of 
the unitary state (Bieberr, 2005; Latifi, 2001). The Agreement was “designed to usher in 
an era of genuine, as opposed to cosmetic power-sharing” between Macedonians and 
Albanians (Gallagher, 2005: 117). Unlike Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement, which aimed to 
maintain peace by institutionalising ethnicity through the creation of separate territorial 
and political communities, Macedonia’s Framework Agreement claimed “there are no 
territorial solutions to ethnic issues” (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 1.1). Its aim was to 
achieve peace through a process of integration, institutional bargaining and 
compromise, at both the municipal and state level, rather than through  the creation of 
either federal or regional levels of governance. Its complexity reflects the delicate 
balance it strikes between consociational and integrative approaches to peace building 
(Bieber, 2005; Daskalovski, 2006; Ilievski, 2007; Maleska, 2005; Minchev, 2005; 
Ordanoski & Matovski, 2007).  In doing so, according the Nadège Ragaru, the 
Agreement endeavoured to “square a circle”; that is, confirm the existence of a unitary 
state whilst promoting institutional recognition of ethnic diversity (Ragaru, 2008, 21). 
Consequently, the Agreement represented a combination of measures designed both to 
favour multi-ethnicity and the integration of ethnic communities (equitable representation 
in public administration and enterprises, parliamentary and municipal committees on 
inter-ethnic relations), and reforms which institutionalise the social and cultural distance 
that already existed between the different communities (enhanced language rights, 
municipal decentralisation and special voting procedures) (Ragaru, 2008).  
Of the minority rights protection mechanisms enshrined in the Framework Agreement, 
greater use of national languages and symbols has probably had most impact on the 
daily lives of citizens. Under the terms of the Agreement and subsequent Law on the 
Use of Languages, the Macedonian language remains the official language in the 
country and is used for international relations4 (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 7; Official 
Gazette 2008b). However, any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the 
population is also recognised as an official language, and can be used for personal 
                                                
3  Hereafter the ‘Framework Agreement’. 
4  See also Article 7 of the amended Constitution (Official Gazette 2001a). 
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documents, civil and criminal proceedings, within municipalities, in communication 
between citizens and central government, and in higher education. Previously, the 
threshold for official use of community languages in municipalities had been 50 percent, 
although this was rarely respected and was indeed annulled by the Constitutional Court 
in 1994 (Official Gazette, 1995, Art. 88; Ilievski, 2007: 5; Caca, 2001: 152). As Joseph 
Marko has noted, although the Albanian language can now be used again in 
parliamentary sessions, Albanian is not an official language ‘throughout’ the country. 
The connection with decentralisation, which will be discussed in greater detail below, is 
therefore of great symbolic significance (Marko, 2004/05: 707). 
With regard to languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the population within a 
municipality, the Agreement also allows the possibility for their use as an official 
language, but the decision to do so remains at the discretion of the local authority 
(Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 6.6). It is worth noting that the 20 percent threshold meant 
that Albanian was the only language other than Macedonian granted recognition at the 
state level. However, this recognition came as a function of demographics, rather than 
as a symbolic recognition of equal status of the ethnic Albanian community (Brown et 
al., 2002: 54). No-where in the Framework Agreement is use of ‘Albanian’ language 
specifically mentioned. The Agreement and subsequent Law on the Use of the Flags of 
the Communities also regulated the use of community emblems, such as the flying of 
community flags in front of local public buildings if that community constitutes a majority 
within a municipality (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 7; Official Gazette, 2005). Previous 
legislation on the use of flags had also been repealed by the Constitutional Court in 
December 1998 (Helsinki Committee, 1999; Ragaru, 2008: 5).  
The consociational principle of non-discrimination and equitable representation within 
public administration and enterprises, at both the national and local level, and within the 
police, was another crucial element of minority protection contained in the Framework 
Agreement5 (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 4). Although the equitable representation of 
Macedonia’s communities had long been declared a state goal, and was indeed 
enshrined in the 1974 Constitution of the Social Republic of Macedonia6, in 2001 the 
reality was very different. Even almost ten years after the conflict, the proportion of 
ethnic Albanians employed in state employment in 2010 remained at 16.9 percent, 
although this represents an improvement on the 10.2 percent employed in 2000 and 8.3 
percent in 1997. The representation of Macedonians, Turks, Roma and Serbs in 2010 
was 77.3 percent, 1.6 percent, 0.7 percent and 1.6 percent respectively (Ombudsman, 
2010: 33). It is worth emphasising that the Framework Agreement did not call for strict 
ethnic quotas in Macedonia’s public administration. This is in contrast to other 
consociation-inspired political settlements, such as Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement. In 
                                                
5  See also Article 8.1 of the amended Constitution (Official Gazette, 2001a). 
6  Chapter 11 entitled 'Equality of Nationalities' stated: “Municipalities and the Republic ensure that 
nationalities be proportionately represented in the municipal assemblies and the assembly of the 
Socialist Republic of Macedonia, and be adequately represented in their bodies (Caca, 2001). 
Lyon, Municipal Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia                                                 31	  
 
Macedonia, state institutions are not obliged by law to employ a certain percentage of a 
particular ethnic group. 
Special voting procedures to ensure greater consensus in decision-making within both 
parliament and municipal councils constitute another mechanism for protecting non-
majority communities living in Macedonia. This procedure, sometimes referred to as 
‘double-majority’ or ‘Badinter7-majority’ voting, operates along similar lines to Arend 
Lijphart’s concept of minority veto and practices adopted in Bosnia. However, it differs in 
that this right is not given to any one particular community; instead it guarantees certain 
Constitutional amendments and legislation8 “cannot be approved without a qualified 
majority of two-thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes from 
those claiming to belong to non-majority communities (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 5)9. 
Whilst offering protection to minority communities against the strength of the majority in 
parliamentary and municipal decision-making, Joseph Marko concedes the procedure 
does not constitute full veto power and represents a much weaker mechanism than 
comparable provisions on veto powers in the constitutions of other ex-Yugoslav 
republics (Marko, 2004/05: 709). One reason for this is the fact that use of ‘double 
majority’ voting in Macedonia is restricted to the following areas of decision-making: 
culture, use of languages, education, personal identification, use of symbols, and issues 
pertaining to local self-government (Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 5.2). In practice it also 
appears to allow only the Albanian minority to block legislation since, although formally 
extended to all minority communities, smaller communities with limited parliamentary 
representation, remain marginalised (Engström, 2002: 18; Bieber, 2005: 111). 
The final aspect of minority protection contained in the Framework Agreement and 
subsequent Constitutional amendments was reform of the parliamentary and municipal 
Committees for Inter-Community Relations. A Human Rights Watch report commented 
in 1996 that, since its formation in 1992, the parliamentary Committee had not played an 
active role in promoting inter-ethnic dialogue; an observation supported by Henryk 
Sokalski, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General to Macedonia (Helsinki 
Committee, 1996: 16; Sokalski, 2003: 69). Under the new configuration its mandate, 
akin with Lijphart’s recommendation for arbitration mechanisms to mediate disputes 
between segments, is to consider issues of inter-community relations, such as 
application of special voting procedures, and to make proposals for their solution. 
Parliament is obliged to consider the Committee’s appraisals and to make decisions 
regarding them. The Parliamentary Committee consists of seven members each from 
the ranks of the Macedonians and Albanians, and five members from among the Turks, 
                                                
7  Named after the French judge Robert Badinter. 
8  The relevant laws were defined as those that “directly affect culture, use of language, education, 
personal documentation, and use of symbols”. However there was no precise definition or delimitation of 
the legislation requiring double-majority approval, and this was to give rise to a dispute during 2006 
when bills on policing and the Broadcasting Council was passed without a double-majority (Reka. 2008: 
66). For further information on the ‘Skopje Agreement’ and the development of a list of laws requiring 
double-majority approval, see Ilievski (2007). 
9  This principle is also enshrined in Article 69.2 of the amended Constitution (Official Gazette, 2001a). 
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Vlach, Roma and two other communities (Official Gazette. 2001a, Official Gazette. 
2007, 3.3). Previously, the Committee had comprised “two members each from the 
ranks of the Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Vlachs and Romanies, as well as two 
members from the ranks of other nationalities in Macedonia” (Official Gazette 1991, Art. 
78). The reduced influence of Macedonia’s smaller communities in this new 
arrangement has prompted some to remark how little attention has been paid to 
promoting the political inclusion of these communities (Bieber, 2005: 112). Similar 
Committees have also been re-established in municipalities where more than 20 percent 
of local inhabitants are from non-majority communities (Official Gazette. 2002: 55). 22 
ethnically mixed municipalities (out of a total of 85) are obliged to establish these 
Committees in accordance with the law. 
2. Municipal Decentralisation: a Territorial Solution to Ethnic Issues? 
Municipal decentralisation was considered such a crucial aspect of Macedonia’s peace 
process that the Law on Local Self-Government was the only law formally stipulated as 
a prerequisite for an international donors’ conference to be held (Macedonia 2001b, 
Annex C). In its Basic Principles, the Framework Agreement declared: “The 
development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation of 
citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities” 
(Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 1.5). Decentralisation sought to offer limited autonomy to 
Macedonia’s ethnic Albanians, compatible with the principles of consociationalism, 
whilst shying away from granting them full or formal autonomy. Indeed, the reforms were 
supported by another Basic Principle which declared: “There are no territorial solutions 
to ethnic issues” (Official Gazette 2001b, Art. 1.2). One ethnic Albanian member of the 
opposition observed in 2003 that decentralisation was “a cure against federalisation” 
(PER, 2003: 11). Florian Bieber noted that decentralisation was framed to conform to 
European standards, especially the principle of subsidarity enshrined in the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, rather than facilitating fully-fledged self-government 
for the ethnic Albanian community (Bieber, 2005: 116).  
Kamelia Dimitrova has concluded that the devolution of power has generally been 
perceived as a positive step towards improving inter-ethnic relations, since it places 
institutional limitations on “unbridled central authority” and provides local communities 
greater control over the management of their own affairs (Dimitrova, 2004: 176). 
Certainly, the Framework Agreement called for enhanced municipal competences10 and 
a revised law on local government financing to ensure fiscal autonomy and sufficient 
resources to enable municipalities fulfill their enhanced responsibilities (Official Gazette, 
2001b). Dimitrova also regards decentralisation as a method for improving the 
                                                
10  Those specifically referenced in the Framework Agreement were: areas of public services, urban and 
rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, primary 
and secondary education, social welfare, and health care (Official Gazette, 2001b) (Official Gazette, 
2002, Art. 22).  
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participation of non-majority communities in public life, thereby increasing their trust and 
identification with the state, and as a way to maintain the unique identity and culture of 
national minorities (Dimitrova, 2004: 176; ICG, 1999: 26).  
A significant fear the majority Macedonian population (and some smaller communities 
as well) held regarding decentralisation in 2001, however, was the concern of being 
marginalised in Albanian-dominated municipalities (Bieber, 2005: 118). The worry was 
that Macedonians would become “foreigners in their own country” because of the 
extensive use of the Albanian language in these municipalities, with their own identities 
being considered under threat (ICG, 2000: 6; Brunnbauer, 2002: 17). Židas Daskalovski 
also suggests a common fear of being denied access to public resources and 
employment, and refers to events in 1991, when ethnic Albanians took local power in 
Tetovo municipality and promptly replaced all Macedonians in charge of the public 
enterprises in the towns with Albanians (Daskalovski, 2006: 212). The fact that ethnic 
communities in Macedonia appear to regard the decentralisation of power to 
municipalities as a zero-sum game, where one gains control over communities at the 
expense of the other, exacerbates such fears (Brunnbauer, 2002: 16). As Nadège 
Ragaru candidly concluded: “the moment one community comprises above 50 percent 
of the total population in any given unit of government, that unit becomes ‘hers’... 
Minority rights might be respected, yet community preference will be the rule rather than 
the exception. In this respect, ‘minorities’ (nationally) do not behave better than the 
‘majority’ when they are locally dominant” (Ragaru, 2008: 25).  
The process of territorial reorganisation during 2004, when municipal boundaries were 
redrawn to create 84 municipalities11 from the previous 123, did little to dispel anxiety 
over the decentralisation process. In fact, it almost undermined the legitimacy of the 
entire process (IRIS, 2006: 9). The apparent lack of any objective criteria upon which to 
make decisions regarding boundary changes suggested to citizens that the 
reorganisation was based largely on political and ethnic compromises (Siljanovska-
Davkova, 2009: 112). A senior ethnic Albanian government official interviewed by 
International Crisis Group at the time explained the logic behind the decisions: “We want 
to maximise the number of municipalities where Albanians make up 20 percent of the 
population [and thereby make Albanian an official language] and we want to bring 
Albanians in connection with the urban centre; the Macedonians want the opposite – to 
preserve Macedonian urban control, keeping Albanians in rural areas and minimising 
the number of 20 percent Albanian municipalities (ICG, 2003: 20). The obvious lack of 
transparency within which new boundaries were redrawn also gave rise to accusations 
that decentralisation was indeed a ‘zero-sum game’ over local control and access to 
resources between the two largest ethnic groups (ICG, 2003: 13). It is within this 
context, therefore, that the process of decentralisation and the importance of effective 
minority protection mechanisms at the municipal level need to be considered. 
                                                
11  Excluding the City of Skopje. 
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3. Minority Rights Protection at the Municipal Level 
With regard to minority protection mechanisms at the local level, it is important to note 
that the Framework Agreement and subsequent legislative amendments replicate most 
of the provisions foreseen at state level. Thus, greater municipal use of national 
languages and symbols, equitable representation of municipal employees, the use of 
‘double-majority’ voting procedures in municipal councils, and the existence of municipal 
Committees for Inter-Community Relations are all enshrined within the Agreement. This 
detail is very often neglected by the municipalities themselves, government agencies 
tasked with monitoring implementation of the Framework Agreement, some international 
organisations based in Macedonia, and academics alike. 
As discussed above, the Framework Agreement and subsequent 2002 Law on Local 
Self-Government enhanced the use of community languages at the municipal level by 
reducing the threshold for official use from 50 to 20 percent. The Agreement also 
allowed for the possibility of languages spoken by less than 20 percent of the local 
population to be recognised as an official language within the municipality. In practice 
this has meant that, in municipalities where the local community constitutes at least 20 
percent, Albanian has acquired official status in 29 of the 85 municipalities (including the 
City of Skopje), Turkish in three municipalities, Serbian in one, and Romani also in one 
(Common Values, 2009: 53). More recently, the rural municipality of Kruševo formally 
recognised the Vlach language even though the local Vlach population constitutes only 
ten percent. Of particular symbolic importance was the redrawing of the City of Skopje’s 
municipal boundary in 2004 to ensure Albanian became an official language in the 
capital (Daskalovski, 2006: 207). The European Stability Initiative has however voiced 
caution in the wake of these legislative changes by suggesting that, regardless of the 
attitudes of local officials or their legal obligations, the problem of language use within 
municipalities will not be resolved until non-majority communities are represented 
significantly in the local administration (ESI, 2002: 30). The OSCE’s survey findings also 
suggest that, in practice, working materials prepared for municipal councils are not 
always provided in all official languages, despite legal obligations to do so (OSCE, 
2009a: 57). Non-majority communities, particularly ethnic Albanians, will therefore need 
to be patient in pursuing this goal  
The Agreement and subsequent Law on the Use of Flags of the Communities also 
regulates the use of community emblems, such as flags in front of municipal buildings 
(Official Gazette, 2001b, Art. 7; Official Gazette, 2005). Although a Constitutional Court 
ruling on 24 October 2007 upheld selected provisions of the 2005 Law, such as the right 
of all recognised communities to display their flag under the same conditions in special 
circumstances, there is currently political agreement among the main political parties in 
Macedonia not to implement this ruling. “While this [ruling] might be in the best interest 
of peaceful inter-ethnic relations in the country”, commented the OSCE in a recent 
report, they also note the situation represents “a serious problem in light of the rule of 
law” (OSCE, 2009b). 
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Equitable representation of all communities within public administration and enterprises 
is another critical aspect of minority protection envisaged at both the central and 
municipal level. However, as with the realisation of community language use locally, 
progress since 2001 in the municipalities has been hampered by practical 
considerations rather than simply a lack of political will. “Often”, observed the OSCE in 
its 2009 Decentralisation Survey, “the municipal leadership is willing to implement the 
principle of equitable representation but possesses only limited resources to do so.” 
Respondents to the same survey regarded the following factors obstruct municipalities’ 
ability to achieve a representative workforce: lack of qualified candidates from non-
majority communities, political pressures to employ staff, and the lack of any legal 
obligation to do so (OSCE, 2009: 58-9). Indeed, considering the post-2001 non-majority 
recruitment drive in the public administration began at time when state agencies were 
under increasing pressure to downsize and when public enterprises were scheduled for 
restructuring, privatisation and often closure, equitable representation has frequently 
been regarded as “one of the most sensitive elements of the Ohrid Agreement” (ICG, 
2003: 13; Ragaru, 2008: 14; Brown et al., 2002: 16).  
With regard to the use of ‘double-majority’ voting procedures designed to ensure greater 
consensus in decision-making by municipal councils, research undertaken by both the 
Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS, 2006) and the Association for 
Democratic Initiatives (ADI, 2006) suggests this practice is “rarely respected on the local 
level”. IRIS’s research notes that the lack of application of the law is felt “especially 
acutely” in newly reorganised towns, such as Struga and Tetovo, where minority 
Macedonians “feel sidelined” in the decision-making process (IRIS, 2006: 14). Indeed, 
Struga municipality’s decision to place a memorial to the killed municipal councillor, 
Nura Mazar, an alleged former National Liberation Army member, was adopted without 
applying this rule (Ragaru, 2008: 26). ADI’s interviews with representatives from the 
multiethnic municipalities of Gostivar, Kičevo, Struga and Debar during 2006 found that 
in many instances council members were either unaware of the compulsory nature of 
the special voting procedures for certain topics or felt its use unnecessary (ADI, 2006: 
17, 64). Other council members interviewed were opposed to the application of special 
voting procedures outright, suggesting their use would be perceived as an indication of 
poor community relations and should therefore be avoided (ADI, 2006: 19, 72, 82). 
Fieldwork undertaken by the author to selected multiethnic municipalities during June 
2010 found that attitudes towards the use of special voting procedures in municipal 
council sessions have not changed significantly. As with the inconsistent application of 
language and community emblem rights locally, limited use of special voting procedures 
in municipal councils implies  non-majority communities are not enjoying the protections 
envisaged in Ohrid and are frequently being marginalised in local decision-making 
processes. 
Finally, the Framework Agreement and subsequent legislation established Committees 
for Inter-Community Relations in municipalities where more than 20 percent of the local 
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population belongs to a certain non-majority community (Official Gazette, 2002, Art. 55). 
Municipalities can also establish Committees in areas where local communities 
comprise less than 20 percent; however this decision is at the discretion of the municipal 
council. Their role is to enable institutional dialogue between the different ethnic 
communities and to act as an instrument for enabling direct citizen participation within 
municipal decision-making processes (CDI, 2007). The Committees are obliged by law 
to review issues that refer to the relationships among the local communities, to provide 
opinions, and to propose ways to resolve problems that may arise between 
communities. They are critical for resolving issues pertinent to non-majority 
communities, particularly those requiring the adoption of special voting procedures, 
since municipal councils are obliged to consider the Committee’s opinions and make 
decisions based on them. The 20 multiethnic municipalities legally required to establish 
such Committees have now done so12 and, according to data collated by ZELS at the 
end of 2010, a further twelve municipalities have on a voluntarily basis (refer to Annex 
B). It is admirable that so many municipalities have recognised the benefit of 
establishing Committees for Inter-Ethnic Relations, even though they are not obliged to 
do so.  
In practice, however, research completed by the Community Development Initiative 
(CDI), a non-governmental organisation based in Tetovo, found the effectiveness of 
these Committees questionable. The research reported how “citizens remain generally 
uninformed on the existence of the [Committees]” (CDI, 2007: 9). The OSCE’s recent 
decentralisation survey collaborates this conclusion, finding that only 19 percent of 
respondents were aware of their existence (OSCE, 2009a: 62). A subsequent interview 
with a senior representative of CDI indicated that their research also found that 
Committee membership remains highly politicised, members have a limited 
understanding of their role, and the frequency with which municipal councils fail to 
consider the recommendations of the Committees is high (CDI March 2009). Such 
criticism has lead an influential United National Programme in Macedonia to conclude in 
2010 that the Committees are “generally found to convene for the sake of demonstrating 
that they have done so, and they rarely provide advisory, preventive or reactive 
recommendations” (UN). 
4. The Experiences of the Smaller Communities Locally 
There has been much academic debate since 2001 regarding what kind of Macedonian 
state the Framework Agreement is designed to promote. In an article entitled ‘Multi-
ethnicity or Bi-nationalism? The Framework Agreement and the Future of the 
Macedonian State‘, Jenny Engström has claimed that implementation of the Framework 
Agreement will effectively signify a move towards the creation of a de facto bi-national 
                                                
12  However missing membership data for half of these 20 municipalities suggests these Committees may 
not be as active as first thought. See Annex B. 
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state in which Macedonians and Albanians constitute the country’s two ethno-political 
elites, whilst “other ethnic communities are largely relegated to the fringes of political 
life” (Engström, 2002: 3). This view is shared by many who have emphasised that the 
Agreement does not provide the same degree of protection for Macedonia’s smaller 
ethnic communities, such as Turks, Roma, Serbs, Vlachs, etc. (Bieber, 2005; 
Daskalovski, 2002; Engström, 2003; Friedman, 2003; Mandaci, 2007; Vankovska, 
2006). The International Crisis Group commented in 2003 on the “revealing irony” that 
the Agreement is unpopular with Orthodox Serbs, Vlachs and Muslim Turks (ICG 2003, 
24). Interestingly, a national opinion poll conducted in 2001 found that as many as 50 
percent of Macedonia’s Turkish population intended to boycott the 2002 parliamentary 
elections in protest that “of all the minorities in Macedonia, only the Albanians will 
benefit from the [Framework] Agreement” (Engström, 2002: 14). Bearing in mind that the 
principle goal of the Framework Agreement had been to redress the asymmetrical 
power-relations between Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, and in doing so avoid 
further conflict, Florian Bieber considers it understandable that the Agreement gave 
greater weight to ethnic Albanian concerns at the expense of others (Bieber, 2005: 109; 
Reka, 2008: 64). Indeed, in reaction to the appointment of a member of the Turkish 
community to the Constitutional Court in 2003, Abdylhadi Veseli, Vice-President of the 
ethnic Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) complained: “Albanians did not 
fight to see their places go to others” (ICG, 2003: 24). 
At an event organised by the internationally-sponsored Project on Ethnic Relations in 
2004 a senior political representative of one of the smaller ethnic communities declared: 
“We should not mistake bilingualism with true multiculturalism” (PER, 2004: 22). The 
politician stressed that, post-2001, very often the concept of multiculturalism had been 
used to argue for the introduction of Albanian as a second official language, and he 
noted that this is not the same as using the languages of all the communities on an 
equal basis. It is worth remembering that out of Macedonia’s 85 municipalities, 
community languages other than Albanian are currently only official in six of them. The 
Framework Agreement leaves the decision to recognise the languages of smaller 
communities at the discretion of municipalities generally dominated by Macedonian or 
ethnic Albanians. To date this option has only been considered by a handful, prompting 
the European Commission to state in its 2009 progress report on Macedonia that “little 
progress can be reported regarding use of the languages of the smaller ethnic 
communities” (EC, 2009: 20). The geographic dispersal of the Turkish, Roma, Serbian, 
and Vlach communities throughout Macedonia means that in most municipalities they 
fall well below the 20 percent threshold, and it has been claimed that the mismanaged 
process of territorial reorganisation in 2004 may have exacerbated this reality. Kenan 
Hasipi, leader of the political party Democratic Party of Turks, for example, claimed prior 
to the reorganisation that “we Turks make up about 36 percent of Vrapčište’s municipal 
population. Under the new, bigger borders, we will be only 12 percent; far below the 
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Ohrid Agreement’s stated 20 percent [for language and other rights]” (Balkanalysis 
24/02/2005; Ragaru, 2005: 19).  
The European Commission’s progress reports on Macedonia for 2009 and 2010 note 
how the representation of the smaller communities, particularly the Turkish and Roma 
communities are still particularly underrepresented in the public administration (EC, 
2009: 21). This finding further supports the claim that not all of Macedonia’s ethnic 
communities are benefitting equally from the protection mechanisms envisaged by the 
Framework Agreement. In its 2010 submission to the Council of Europe regarding its 
compliance with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the 
Government reported: “from 2004 to September 2008 ... a total number of 774 persons 
belonging to the communities which do not constitute the majority ... were employed ... 
729 of these are persons belonging to the Albanian community (94.1%), 24 are Turks 
(3.1%), 13 Roma (1.6%), 5 Bosniaks (0.6%) and 3 others (0.38%)” (Government of R. 
Macedonia 2010, 10). Employment data from a selection of fifteen multiethnic 
municipalities displayed in Annex A also suggests that progress on achieving equitable 
representation within municipal administrations has been inconsistent across 
municipalities and the different non-majority groups. Whilst improvement to the equitable 
representation of the ethnic Albanian community has been greater in some 
municipalities than others (noticeably in those with an ethnic Albanian Mayor)13; the 
smaller communities remain frequently under-represented14. In March 2010 the daily 
newspaper Dnevnik noted how Ivan Stoiljkovic from the Democratic Party of Serbs and 
Amdi Bajram from the Roma Alliance had decided to boycott the work of the 
Parliamentary Committee for Interethnic Relations until agreement is reached on the 
employment of their communities in the public administration (Dnevnik, 2010).  
With regard to the use of ‘double-majority’ voting procedures in municipal councils and 
the work of municipal Committees for Inter-Community Relations, again the smaller 
communities have benefitted least from these protection mechanisms. As previously 
discussed, the use of special voting procedures at both the parliamentary and municipal 
levels only seem to benefit the larger minority communities, leaving the rest politically 
marginalised (Engström, 2002; Bieber, 2005). Membership of the municipal Committees 
for Inter-Community Relations also suggests that the smaller communities, particularly 
the Roma, are frequently sidelined. The Committee membership data displayed at 
Annex B illustrates how the smaller communities, when they are represented, are 
frequently outnumbered by the representatives of other, larger local communities, 
notably Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The significant under-representation of 
                                                
13  Progress has been greatest in Brvenica, Čair, and Vrapčište municipalities (all with ethnic Albanian 
Mayors); whilst less impressive in Čaška, Jegunovce, Kičevo, Kruševo, Mavrovo and Rostuša, Petrovec, 
Sopište, Zelenikovo (all with Macedonian Mayors). 
14  In particular the Serbs in Kumanovo, the Roma in Kichevo, and the Bosniak community in Petrovec. It is 
important to note that Serbs in Čučer-Sandevo and Staro Nagoričane are in fact over-represented in the 
municipal administrations. However, staffing numbers are small in both municipalities, which may make 
the proportional analysis less accurate. 
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women in the membership of these Committees is another alarming development which 
undoubtedly affects local communities’ ability to represent their diverse needs effectively 
to the local administration. Since there are currently no consequences for municipalities 
when a community is not represented within a Committee or where that representation 
is unequal, the NGO Forum doubts municipal leaders will attach a high priority towards 
resolving such breaches in implementation of the law (Forum, 2008: 7). 
Conclusion 
In summary, it is clear that not all of Macedonia’s ethnic communities are benefitting 
equally from the minority protection mechanisms enshrined in the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement and the decentralisation reforms thus far. There were and still are ‘losers’ in 
Macedonia’s post-conflict political landscape, and these are the smaller ethnic 
communities living scattered throughout the country who fail to reach the thresholds 
required to benefit from the envisaged protection mechanisms. As a result, these 
smaller communities are denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in their local 
administrations and to influence the delivery of newly devolved competencies in a way 
which benefits their own communities. Macedonians and ethnic Albanians residing in 
small numbers in municipalities where another ethnic community may be in the majority 
are also subject to a similar fate. The reason for this is partly because the Framework 
Agreement was never actually designed to offer equal protection to all Macedonia’s 
ethnic communities, and partly a result of poor implementation of the law at state and, 
most significantly, municipal levels. The principle aim of Framework Agreement in 2001 
had been to address the grievances of the ethnic Albanian community and in doing so, 
avert further conflict. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that almost nine years on, 
the Agreement is failing to offer adequate protection to all Macedonia’s ethnic 
communities equally.  
An analysis of minority protection in Macedonia must be placed within the context of a 
wider debate regarding what kind of state the Framework Agreement was designed to 
promote and fundamentally, what type of state citizens want Macedonia to become. The 
conflict in 2001 and experiences to date suggest Macedonia is indeed moving towards 
becoming a bi-national state. The more the two largest communities continue to regard 
decentralisation and the protection mechanisms enshrined in the Framework Agreement 
as a zero-sum game, the further this reality will be achieved and the fate of Macedonia’s 
smaller communities sealed. Initial steps have recently been taken to improve the lot of 
these communities, but their impact so far has been negligible. More urgently needs to 
be achieved if Macedonia is to remain a genuinely multicultural state. 
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Annex A: Equitable Representation within Selected Municipal Administrations15 
 
No. 
 
Name of 
Municipality 
No. of Pop 
/ Staff 
Mac. 
% 
Alban. 
% 
Turkish 
% 
Roma 
% 
Vlach 
% 
Serb 
% 
Bosniak 
% 
Other 
% 
1 Brvenica 15855 37.5 61.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.3 
  2006 12 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 16 37.5 62.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 Čair 64823 24.1 57.0 6.9 4.8 0.1 1.0 4.6 1.5 
  2006 36 55.6 38.9 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 58 29.3 67.2 5.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 Časka 7673 57.3 35.2 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.8 
  2006 11 100.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 22 86.4 9.1 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 
 
Čučer - 
Sandevo 
8493 47.3 22.9 0.0 0.3 0.2 28.6 0.0 0.8 
  2006 18 44.4 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 23 39.1 8.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.2 0.0 0.0 
5 Dolneni 13568 35.9 26.7 19.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 17.5 0.6 
  2006 8 62.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 16 56.3 6.3 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 
6 Jegunovce 10790 55.3 43.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 
  2006 11 90.9 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 17 88.2 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
7 Kičevo 30138 53.6 30.5 8.1 5.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.9 
  2006 61 88.5 8.2 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 89 83.1 11.2 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 Kruševo 9684 62.8 21.3 3.3 0.0 10.5 0.4 1.4 0.3 
  2006 20 75.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 22 81.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9 Kumanovo 105484 60.4 25.9 0.3 4.0 0.1 8.6 0.0 0.6 
  2006 76 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 118 80.5 11.9 0.0 0.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 0.8 
10 
 
Mavrovo  
& Rostuša 
8618 50.5 17.2 31.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.7 
  2006 11 72.7 9.1 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.3 
  2010 15 53.3 0.0 26.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
11 Petrovec 8255 51.4 22.9 0.9 1.6 0.0 5.0 17.5 0.7 
  2006 10 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 21 90.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 
12 Sopište 5656 60.2 34.3 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.5 
  2006 18 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 
  2010 30 86.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 
                                                
15  Data from selected multiethnic municipal administrations taken from the Directory of the Municipalities in 
the Republic of Macedonia (MCIC 2006; 2010). 
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No. 
 
Name of 
Municipality 
No. of Pop 
/ Staff 
Mac. 
% 
Alban. 
% 
Turkish 
% 
Roma 
% 
Vlach 
% 
Serb 
% 
Bosniak 
% 
Other 
% 
13 
 
Staro     
Nagoričane 
4840 80.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.1 0.0 0.1 
  2006 11 45.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 54.5 0.0 0.0 
  2010 19 52.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.4 0.0 0.0 
14 Vrapčište 25399 4.1 83.1 12.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
  2006 6 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 34 8.8 82.4 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
15 Zelenikovo 4077 61.9 29.6 0.0 2.3 0.0 1.1 4.7 0.5 
  2006 8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  2010 8 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Annex B: Membership Data for Municipal Committees for Inter-Ethnic 
Relations16 
 
 
No. Municipality Required 
by Law? 
No. of 
Members 
No. of 
Female 
Members 
No. of 
Municipal 
Council 
Members 
All Local 
Communities 
Represented? 17 
Equal 
Representation of 
Communities? 
1 Brvenica Yes 6 0 2 No: S = 0.49% Yes 
2 Butel Yes      
3 Čair18 Yes 4 1  No: R = 4.76% Yes 
4 Čaška Yes 5 1  No: A = 35.23%,  
T = 5.1% 
 
5 Čucer 
Sandevo 
Yes      
6 Debar19 Yes 5 0  Yes Yes 
7 Dolneni Yes      
8 Jegunovce Yes 5 1 5 - all Yes No – 3M, 2A 
9 Kičevo Yes      
10 Kruševo Yes 5 0  No:  V = 10.53% Yes 
11 Kumanovo Yes 12 2 0 - none Yes Yes 
12 Mavrovo & 
Roštusa 
Yes      
13 Petrovec Yes      
14 Sopište Yes      
15 Struga20 Yes 8 0  Yes Yes 
16 Šuto Orizari Yes 5 0    
17 Tetovo21 Yes 5 0  Yes Yes 
18 Vraneštica Yes      
19 Vrapčište Yes      
20 Zelenikovo Yes      
21 Bogovinje No 3 1 3 No: T = 4.09% No – all Albanian 
22 Dojran No 5 1 5 - all No: R = 1.05%  
(A = only 0.47%) 
No – 2A, 1M,  
1S, 1T 
23 Drugovo No 3 1 1 No: A = 4.77%  No – 2T 
24 Gevgelija No 5 2 0 Yes Yes 
25 Gostivar22 No 4 0  Yes Yes 
26 Kratovo No 5 1 5 - all No: S = 0.23% 
(T = only 0.08%) 
No – 3M, 1T, 1R 
27 Lipkovo No 5 0 2 No: S = 1.7% No – 3A, 2M 
28 Lozovo No 7 1 2 Yes No – 2T 
29 Oslomej No 5 0 4 Yes No – 4A, 1M 
30 Saraj No 3 0 3 - all No: M = 3.9%,  
B = 3.2% 
No – all Albanian 
                                                
16  This data was collected directly from municipalities by ZELS in September 2010. 
17  The following abbreviations apply to the different nationalities: Albanian - A, Bosniak - B, Macedonian - 
M, Roma - R, Serbian - S, Turkish - T, Vlach - V. 
18  (Foundation Metamorphosis & Common Values, p.26) 
19  (Foundation Metamorphosis & Common Values, p.25) 
20 Information available at Municipality of Struga’s website: 
www.struga.gov.mk/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=76&Itemid=117&la
ng=sq (Accessed: April 7, 2010). 
21  (Foundation Metamorphosis & Common Values, p.26) 
22  (Foundation Metamorphosis & Common Values, p.26) 
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No. Municipality Required 
by Law? 
No. of 
Members 
No. of 
Female 
Members 
No. of 
Municipal 
Council 
Members 
All Local 
Communities 
Represented? 23 
Equal 
Representation of 
Communities? 
31 Staro 
Nagoricane 
No 5 1 2 Yes No – 4M, 1S 
32 Valandovo No 6 2 6 - all No: R = 6.27% Yes 
 
 
                                                
23  The following abbreviations apply to the different nationalities: Albanian - A, Bosniak - B, Macedonian - 
M, Roma - R, Serbian - S, Turkish - T, Vlach - V. 
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